Fat Coalition, Will It Benefit Supporting Parties?

The news of Nasdem and PKB joining the Prabowo-Gibran government coalition has colored the latest dynamics of national political consolidation post-election. The entry of these two leading parties of the Coalition for Change automatically adds to the foundation of the executive government coalition in the legislative space.

The addition of Nasdem and PKB means the government coalition controls almost three-quarters of the seats in the DPR. Control of parliamentary seats in the opposition camp, which so far is represented by PDI-P and PKS, is only around 28 percent.

The weakness of this opposition can be a bad sign for the course of democracy in Indonesia. Without a competent opposition force, the opposing voices of citizens against policies will be difficult to accommodate.

Also read: Parliamentary Support Determines the Fate of Democracy

Not always profitable

Perhaps joining the government coalition may be a tempting option for parties that did not join the winning coalition in the last election.

Being a lonely opposition seems difficult. The fear of not being involved in various development agendas makes parties and politicians shudder, and they are reluctant to take a position against the government.

However, is joining a coalition a more beneficial option? In the experience of parties in several other countries, this step has actually backfired. This is especially true for parties that enter the government coalition after the election.

This conclusion emerged from Klüver and Spoon's 2019 study published in the Journal of Politics. Based on research conducted in 28 European elections between 1972 and 2017, parties that lose an election and join the winning coalition tend to experience setbacks in the next election.

One example can be seen from Germany's Social Democratic Party (SPD) in the 2017 election. Previously, the SPD had won 193 seats in the 2013 election. This achievement was quite far behind Chancellor Merkel's Union Party (CDU/CSU), which won 311 seats. As the second-largest party, the SPD instead entered the government coalition, rather than becoming an opposition force.

In the next election, the SPD's vote significantly decreased. In the 2017 election, the SPD only managed to obtain 153 seats in the German parliament, or about one-fifth less than their previous election results. The SPD's position was further squeezed when CDU/CSU removed them from the German government coalition for the 2017-2021 period.

Similar issues were also faced by the Liberal Alliance (LA) party in the 2019 Denmark elections. Previously, in the 2015 elections, LA managed to gain 7.5% of the votes, which translated into 13 seats in parliament.

As a party with the fifth largest share, LA joined a coalition led by the People's Party of Denmark (DPP) in the second position, Venstre in the third position, and the conservative party in the ninth position.

The position of LA as one of the juniors in the coalition proved to be a boomerang for the party. In the next election, LA's votes dropped to 2.33 percent. With this result, LA was only able to occupy 4 seats. The party's position also fell from being in the middle to become a lower-tier party in Danish politics.

In a long-term study conducted by Klüver and Spoon, the phenomena of SPD in Germany and LA in Denmark is not something strange. In fact, out of 219 election cases studied, the SPD and LA phenomena appeared to be predictable trends.

In general, the junior party's acquisition that joined the government coalition experienced an average decline of 17 percent in the elections after the party joined.

Also read: Maintain Democracy, PDI-P and PKS are Expected to Stay Outside the Government

Difficult to fulfill promises

One of the main reasons for this decline is the failure of small parties to meet the expectations of their constituents after joining the government coalition.

When a party that was previously in a different camp enters the government coalition, it is difficult for them to persuade other parties whose position is more established within the coalition to support their agenda.

In the context of Indonesia's political dynamics, this situation is similar to the case of PKB joining the Prabowo-Gibran government coalition. When they met, PKB Chairman Muhaimin Iskandar entrusted eight change agendas to the elected president Prabowo Subianto.

Although good, there is no guarantee that the agenda pushed by the PKB will be accepted by the government coalition.

Moreover, the number of parties in the coalition is quite high, with each party carrying its own agenda. Therefore, there is a high possibility that all of these agendas can be implemented even though PKB is part of the government coalition.

This has also happened in the German Government coalition during the period of 2009-2013. At that time, FDP received a considerable achievement of 61 seats or around 10% of the votes. As the third-largest party with the most votes, FDP decided to enter the government coalition built by CDU/CSU.

In the 2009 election, one of the factors that boosted the votes for FDP was the campaign related to tax reform agenda. Unfortunately, FDP's maneuvering space in the narrow coalition and this agenda stalled for four years. Disappointed FDP constituents switched their support, resulting in FDP not getting any seats in parliament in the 2013 election.

Also read: Considering Various Inputs, PDI-P Holds National Working Meeting to Formulate Political Direction

Different direction

Not only that, political differences are also another reason for the loss of constituents when a party enters a coalition. This happened in the case of LA in Denmark in 2019.

In 2015, LA, a liberal party, joined the government coalition filled with parties leaning towards conservatism. LA's voice in the following election also declined as constituents saw inconsistency in the party.

This incident also happened to SPD in Germany. In the 2013 election, the center-left oriented SPD actually joined Merkel's center-right coalition. Confused constituents flocked away from the SPD in the 2017 election because they felt that the party had lost its policy platform.

However, this trend that occurs in several advanced democratic countries will not necessarily occur in Indonesia, at least in the near future. The reason is, based on a study from Fossati et al in 2020, parties in Indonesia do not have ideological differences like those in Western democratic countries.

In Indonesia, the only significant difference, both in the eyes of constituents and internally, is how much religiosity is contained within the party.

On one hand, the lack of this trend in Indonesian politics could be good news for parties within the country. However, on the other hand, this could be a signal that democracy in Indonesia has yet to fully thrive.

Without clear ideological distinctions, policy platforms brought by political parties are difficult to differentiate from one another. Ultimately, electoral politics in Indonesia only rely on gimmicks with minimal discourse on development. (LITBANG KOMPAS)

Also read: PDI-P Not Abandoned, Gibran: Joining the Government is the Party's Decision