Hope in the Opposition
Opposition is needed not to pose a threat to the authorities, but to keep everything balanced and under control.
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The fall of democratic countries (democratic breakdowns) in the period 2000-2024 took place more quickly than expected.
Consecutive independent observations and research present data, with Indonesia as one of them, indicating the increasing tendency towards authoritarianism. Our 2024 election is one of the elections in Southeast Asia that leaves a big problem with the potential for long-term effects.
Previously, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand were plagued by acute political instability following their 2022 and 2023 elections, marked by the blind pragmatism of elites in building toxic compromises and coalitions with old rivals. The result was futile sacrifices and massive efforts to protect the interests of the elite, shield themselves from legal cases and controversies, and the depletion of reform agendas.
Also read: The Paradox of Democracy Without Opposition
One of the highlighted features of these complications is the weakening of the opposition. Their empty role contributed to the birth of an uncontrolled regime characterized by the minimal presence of opposition groups.
However, some scholars, such as Laura Gamboa (2023), see a glimmer of hope. The strengthening trend of authoritarianism, backdoor compromises, constitutional distortions, nepotism, and dynastic politics has created enough fuel for the opposition to strike back.
Two strategies
The public is often misled by the long-standing illusion that we are a democratic country simply because we hold orderly elections.
The fact of regular elections is not wrong, but recent research findings show that autocratic leaders actually utilize and are "legitimately" born from elections (Morgenbesser and Pepinski 2019; Schnaudt 2023). This is where observations must be shifted to see if regular elections can also produce a democratic political situation, quality leaders, and particularly, a strong opposition.
Amidst numerous dismal reports on democracy in the world, Gamboa sees a glimmer of hope projecting the imminent presence of opposition forces due to their disgust with authoritarian tendencies and erosion of democracy that harm them. From the diligence in documenting political opposition cases around the world, Gamboa concludes two underlying strategies.
First, there is an extrainstitutional strategy that aims to confront the ruling regime radically through methods such as mobilizing street protests, long boycotts, work stoppages, and, most extreme, a coup. An example of this strategy choice occurred in Venezuela from 2002-2005.
However, as a tiring and expensive strategy, often carried out recklessly and unsuccessfully, this strategy can actually strengthen the position of authoritarian regimes, giving them the power to conduct large-scale repression, increasing the number of victims, and wiping out opposition forces down to the roots.
The second way, the intra-institutional strategy, tries to fight the situation with more moderate targets.
The opposition group is part of a long-term struggle spectrum that involves negotiations, discussions and public campaigns, critical parliamentary activities, and gradual awareness building at the community level. This opposition strategy is being implemented in Colombia, where the opposition group slowly gains public sympathy, expands national and international alliances, and prevents and disrupts controversial, anti-democratic agendas of the state.
Indonesia needs a broad alliance that can not only generate sympathy for domestic citizens, but also international critical groups.
Support for democracy
The big problem is that both paths, which bring about quick high-risk success and long-lasting low-risk success, both require two things that still need to be fought for. First, solid domestic support for democracy. A supportive citizen attitude in defending democratic institutions and critical groups is something that extends the opposition's breath.
Such support is already happening in our country, through various channels, from the casual ones on social media to the formal ones in parliament and political parties. Although some surveys show that our citizens view the economic situation as much more important than democracy, the daily findings in the field indicate hope for the revival and health of our democracy.
The second requirement is international support. The lesson from the setback of democracy in Hungary shows how important the support of the international community, particularly the European Union, can contribute to the pressure on authoritarian regimes.
Indonesia needs a broad alliance that is not only able to foster sympathy for domestic citizens, but also international critical groups. Two pressures from within and outside will be a balanced combination to provide a healthy life for opposition groups outside the government. On the other hand, national and international silence is an emergency. A passive attitude of ignoring anti-democratic methods is a big thing that hastened the downfall of our democracy.
The author added a third condition, which is the growth of new alternative political forces in parliament. Instead of relying on old political maps dominated by party profiles with problematic records, the birth of new parties initiated from the bottom, with systematic cadres and measured and progressive political platforms, is a refreshing change.
The inspiration for this is the Move Forward Party in Thailand, which advocates for the revision and amendment of the constitution with the aim of reducing the authoritative power of the government. This simple but highly focused mission has gained public sympathy, allowing the relatively new party dominated by relatively young groups to win the 2023 elections.
Although still struggling against a series of repression and antidemocratic actions, this party has inspired many countries to offer alternatives through the formal power of progressive political parties, with more courage.
We in Indonesia have a foundation that can fulfill these three requirements. However, a strong opposition is needed not to threaten those in power, but to ensure balance, control, guarantee the rights and obligations of the people, and ultimately create what was envisioned and promoted during our election campaigns throughout 2023 and 2024: a joyful and happy state.
Rendy Pahrun Wadipalapa, Political Researcher, PhD from the School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds